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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7130
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 3513
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0287
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3579
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 3079
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1237
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017
TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [CASC](#) [PGOV](#) [LE](#)
SUBJECT: LEBANON: EAC TO ADDRESS THREATS TO EMBASSY

REF: TD-314/02407-07

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.5 (c) and (d).

SUMMARY

¶1. (S) On January 12 the DCM convened the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) to review current threats in the wake of the early morning attack against Embassy Athens. EAC members discussed press reports of the Athens attack, reftel description of an alleged missile threat against Embassy Beirut, and implications for Embassy Beirut of the recent arrest of Iranian personnel in Irbil, Iraq. Beirut EAC concluded that there was no apparent substantive relationship between the Athens attack and threats to Embassy Beirut. The Irbil action, however, raises the question of Embassy Beirut as a possible target of Iranian reprisals. End Summary.

ATHENS ATTACK

¶2. (C) The EAC, after a review of press accounts of the January 12 early morning rocket attack against Embassy Athens, saw no connections between this attack and possible new threats against Embassy Beirut. Terrorist groups in Lebanon, including Hizballah, have long had the capacity to fire rockets into the 17-acre Embassy Beirut compound.

¶3. (C) In the wake of the Athens attack, RSO contacted the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which added some checkpoints in the vicinity of the Embassy compound and ramped up roving patrols. Neither the LAF nor the ISF had any new threat information, including possible demonstrations against the Embassy.

¶4. (SBU) The EAC noted that on January 10 the full Embassy, including locally-engaged employees, held a duck-and-cover exercise, including retreat to underground bunkers. The RSO plans to lead an emergency destruction drill the week of January 15. The EAC agreed to urge all Embassy personnel to minimize holdings of classified material.

MISSILE ATTACK THREAT

¶5. (S/NF) The EAC reviewed reftel, subject: Alleged Threat of a Possible Missile Attack by Arab Liberation Front and the

Iraqi Socialist Ba'th Party against American Embassy Beirut.
All members of the EAC agreed that we were unable to assess
the credibility of this report, distributed on January 11,
12007.

POSSIBLE IRANIAN REPRISALS

16. (S) The EAC took note of the recent arrest by U.S.
forces of Iranian government personnel in Irbil, Iraq.
Discussion of these arrests, including the possible
activities of the arrested Iranians, turned to Iran's
substantial presence and influence in Lebanon. The Iranian
presence here includes a large embassy and well-trained
troops of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Forces. Iranian
influence centers on Hizballah. The EAC agreed that we
should continue to monitor actions against Iranian diplomatic
offices in Iraq and be mindful that if Iran were to choose to
effect reprisals against U.S. diplomatic facilities, Embassy
Beirut would be a plausible target.

WARNING TO CITIZENS

17. (C) The EAC agreed that recent threats including those
discussed above would be focused on the official U.S.
presence in Lebanon rather than the American community at
large. In this respect, EAC members considered the existing
warden messages and travel warning to be appropriate.

FELTMAN